In the beginning: 1991 and all that
To help us explain what has happened in Russia since the great collapse of 1991, three rather banal observations need to be made at the outset. The first is that the crisis in 1991 was as much a political crisis as it was an economic one; the second is that reform did not start with a blank slate in 1992; and the third is that the structure of the ex-Soviet economy was peculiarly unsuitable for market reform. No doubt the last observation might come as something of a shock to economic reformers and economists. 16 They, after all, would like us lesser mortals to think that they have discovered the intellectual equivalent of the alchemist's stone; that there is a set of rules which if followed will lead to prosperity for all; and that the introduction of private property and competitive market prices are bound to work their magic in any society, at any time.
Were that life were so simple. However, the idea -that a strong dose of capitalism would resolve Russia's problems -was one which fell on ready soil in Russia in late 1991, and for good reason. Four years of stunted reform under the leadership of Mikhail Gorbachev had wrecked the control systems of the centrally planned economy, without creating any effective mechanism to put in its place. Wage payments, money supply, and government spending had gone through the roof. Production had slumped as plan targets were abandoned. The federal budget had effectively collapsed. Goods had disappeared from store shelves. And inflation was rampant. Nor was this all. Repeated efforts to reform the Soviet economy had failed, and the rulers of newly-independent Russia were desperate for new economic ideas. 17 1991 was therefore a genuine turning-point economically. However, it also represented a political crossroads as well. First, in August 1991, the abortive coup effectively unseated Gorbachev. Then, within a few days, the mercurial Yeltsin took over. And by the end of the year, the USSR fell apart when Russia and Ukraine defected from the Union. This somewhat unfortunate combination of events meant, in effect, that 16 Two American observers who were not shocked by Russia's failure to make the transition were, Marshall I. Russia's new rulers faced not just one task -of revamping the economy -but the other equally important tasks of building a new Russian nation and constructing novel democratic forms in a period of imperial collapse. 18 The situation was hardly propitious, as even some of the more optimistic of Western commentators noted at the time. It certainly made Russia very different to China, where a stable leadership was not only able to contemplate economic reform without the dangerous trappings of democracy, but could do so without a threat to its periphery or the position of those of its citizens living outside the main core. 19 Moreover, whereas in China there was a distinct sense of identity constructed over nearly 3000 years of history, there was no such thing in Russia. Too closely bound up with the communist era to be of much practical use to the new Russian elite, nationalism might have been something that Russians paid lip-service to, but it was not something that could be used easily to mobilize the new Russian nation.
Under these difficult circumstances the regime set out along the yellow brick road which it hoped would bring Russia, sooner rather than later, to the market. The market however did not just promise prosperity and abundance: it appeared to furnish the new, and rather insecure Russian ruling group, with a ready-made objective around which they hoped to unite the Russian people. It also served to create the very strong impression that in spite of many other areas of continuity -especially at the top -the new regime was quite different to the old one, with a new set of goals, a new outlook and a new international mantle of respectability. Indeed, by parading its new-found market credentials, Russian leaders assumed they could win sympathy in the West and so tap into what they thought would be a particularly deep pool of Western economic loans. 20 Finally, one should never underestimate the motor power of self-interest, and the more cynical would later argue that the rhetoric of marketization was merely a smoke-screen behind which the old elite could ruthlessly set about looting the country's assets for its own private benefit. devoted to the development of the nation's arsenal. 22 It was also very widely spread out. Held together by a thin network of railways and pipelines (but few roads), the Soviet economy was a nightmare in terms of structure. Transport alone accounted for a much higher proportion of final cost than other economies with either easy access to excellent roads or to the world's oceans.
These were not the only obstacles, however. A large number of Soviet industries were located in the more peripheral and distant parts of the former USSR, and had been placed there for reasons which had little to do with economic rationality and everything with national security or the need to exploit a crucial raw material. This raised the obvious question -what would happen to these and the people employed in them, if, and when, they were exposed to the forces of supply and demand? Take the industries and the three million people living north of the Arctic circle. There is no way that a market economy could sustain either. decide to use the IMF, rather than any other body, to be its point man? There were at least three important reasons.
One, clearly, was to justify the Fund's existence. 23 Set up in the immediate post-war period to manage the fixed exchange rate regime of the post-war economic order, by the 1970s and the abandonment of that regime in favor of floating rates, the IMF appeared to have lost its raison d'etre. It had become, in effect an organization without a clear mission. 24 The collapse of communism in Eastern Europe in 1989, followed two years later by the implosion of the USSR, at last seemed to provide it with one. Moreover, the Fund had already gained valuable experience in the 1980s putting together structural adjustment packages for the heavily-indebted economies of Latin American and Poland, and it was assumed that it would be able to do the same again for the Russian economy.
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The IMF's willingness to shoulder the burden of the Russian transformation was also opportune from the point of view of US policy-makers. President Bush, recall, had put all his eggs in the now-shattered Gorbachev basket; caught off-guard by the abrupt turn of events, the US administration swam with the tide and backed Yeltsin's bold reform efforts. However, by the time Clinton took office in January 1993, he had neither the inclination, nor the authority, to craft a brand new approach to the Russian economic transition.
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Thus, shifting the responsibility to the IMF made perfect political sense, especially for an administration more concerned to focus on domestic issues rather than foreign ones. Furthermore, even though the US had enormous influence in the institution (and could thus determine IMF policy towards Russia) it was unwilling to lend large amounts to support Russian reform. Working through the IMF, therefore, permitted the US to push Russia in a direction it hoped it would go, but without having to fork out huge sums of money itself.
Indeed, far from being particularly generous themselves, the Americans overall tended to leave the It was also believed, finally, that if the US could work through a body like the Fund this might reduce popular Russian opposition to economic reform. The political logic here was quite straightforward. If
America was seen to be imposing painful reform upon its vanquished foe, then there was every chance this would be used by Russian communists and nationalists alike to attack the reform programme -using antiAmericanism as the obvious vehicle for doing so. If however the IMF was seen to be in the vanguard of change, this might lessen the political reaction to reform from within Russia itself. Whether this was a reasonable calculation or not was not at all clear. However, the assumption was that if change was seen to be coming from an ostensibly independent, multilateral institution and not the US, this would make the reforms more palatable.
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How well-suited the IMF actually was to carry out the job it had been allotted is, of course, a moot point.
The organization after all 'had no more experience than any other institution in supporting the transition from communism to capitalism'. 29 The Fund was also an economic instrument at heart. Hence, it was not suited nor required to think about the political implications of its decisions. Nor was it asked to reflect about the larger strategic questions and the West's more general interests in making Russia a stable partner in the international system. It had one brief and one brief alone: to sit down with the authorities in Russia and provide them with irresistible arguments (under pressure) as to why they should abandon the economic habits of a lifetime and go for the market. 27 Of the $150bn that Russia owed the West in 1999, 40% was held in Germany. 28 How successful this was is examined by Peter Reddaway in 'Visit to a maelstrom', The New York Times, 10 January 1994.
The Cure
The Cure -known by its critics as 'shock therapy' -consisted of a Holy Trinity of policies: monetary stabilization; liberalization; and privatization. Most of these policies, generically known as the Washington consensus, had already proved their effectiveness in a wide variety of other circumstances. 31 And the hope obviously was that they would be equally effective under conditions in Russia. Let us deal with each in turn.
Monetary stabilization was seen as the most pressing of the policy troika. Money after all is the essence of capitalism, and without stable money the price system cannot work, and investment cannot take place. One thing that the state can and must do is introduce a stable currency; in particular it must prevent hyperinflation. Given the problems with measuring price levels and money supply, an easy way to check whether a country is succeeding in price stabilization is to make the currency convertible and use the exchange rate as the nominal anchor of your stabilization program. This has the virtue of simplicity -everyone from the Wall Street banker to the street-corner babushka knows what is the rouble/dollar exchange rate on any particular day. Given the resource constraints under which even the IMF must operate, using the stability of the exchange rate as a signal for how reform is doing in Russia was attractively simple.
The second supporting leg of the tripod was liberalization, and involved lifting restrictions on business activity, domestic and international. Price controls would thus be removed and subsidies ended. Restrictions on new business formation would also be scrapped, and private businesses given free access to foreign trade. Quotas and duties on exports would in turn be eliminated and import tariffs lowered. to whomever was willing to buy them, while those enterprises which stayed in state hands would be weaned off subsidies and given hard budget constraints. At the same time, bankruptcy legislation would be introduced and enforced to ensure the closure of loss-making firms and the redistribution of their resources (machinery, premises and labor) to more efficient producers. Though this formula may have worked elsewhere, in Russia it faced a serious problem: there were no private agents with the capital necessary to purchase enterprises. This meant that state-owned firms had to be either sold to foreigners -a politically difficult path to follow -or given away to domestic buyers at below market value. This is precisely what happened with the result that the privatization process essentially became a vehicle for the legitimization of the seizure of state assets by the more energetic members of the old communist-industrialist nomenklatura.
Overall, then, the IMF approach focused primarily on macro-economic policies. Questions of market regulation and institution-building were to be postponed to a later date. It was argued that premature moves to increase state control -before liberalization was completed -would merely provide a cover for communist reactionaries to re-impose a state-controlled economy. It was assumed that the institutional infrastructure (laws, regulatory agencies, etc.) was either in place already, or could be built quickly -either imported or driven by the enlightened self-interest of the new elites. 34 The underlying assumption was that 32 Non-Communist Russia's exports however continued to be very 'Soviet' in nature: about 45% being in oil and gas and 15% in metals. Moreover, the revenues earned privately from the sale of these commodities were not reinvested back into their respective industries. getting the incentives right would lead to the emergence of economic agents who would have a vested interest in creating institutions to protect their long-term property rights. Thus in a neat display of recursive logic, the provision of a rule of law was treated as endogenous to the transition model. The demand for secure contracts would create the supply of institutions to provide them.
Democracy from above or Yeltsin rules -OK?
One of the real and many paradoxes of the West's approach to economic reform in Russia was that while it made great play of the need for more economic choice, it put an enormous amount of pressure on Russian decision-makers to go down one particular path. Equally, while Western policy-makers talked easily about the need for democracy and greater political freedom in Russia, the form of democracy they promoted was especially elitist in nature. 35 This had a particular impact both upon the way the reforms were introduced and perceived within Russia itself. Indeed, whereas in East-Central Europe, shock therapy was introduced by Committee were not directly accountable to the parliament, or to anybody in particular.
Significantly, however, these characteristics of the new Russian political system were not seen as problems but instead regarded as virtues by Russia's Western advisors. In fact, in their eyes, it was absolutely vital to by-pass all potential opposition to economic reforms coming (as they feared) from conservative groups with a vested interest in the pre-1991 status quo -that is communist bureaucrats and workers in subsidized industries (such as military plants). And such impediments, it was believed, could only be overcome with speed, international leverage and by a highly presidentialist system which vested great powers in the man at the top -in this case Yeltsin. This model of vested interests blocking reform certainly looked plausible. It also looked familiar. That was the pattern of social interests that had undermined Gorbachev's reform efforts in the 1980s. It was also typical of the political economy of protectionist coalitions in Latin America -entrenched elites and periodically-mobilized urban masses.
As it turned out, these fears proved groundless. To all intents and purposes, the old Soviet military industrial complex was politically disemboweled by the rapid collapse of communist institutions and proved totally unable to defend their interests in the transition economy. As for the masses, they proved politically inert despite (or perhaps because of) shattering social changes, a massive fall in living standards, and tremendous uncertainty about their future well-being. 36 Indeed, some radical critics of shock therapy have argued that
this is precisely what the reforms were intended to do; to literally bludgeon any potential social opposition into submission. After all, people who are worried about keeping their job, or feeding their family, are less likely to resort to political violence. Whatever the truth, the workers did not rise up. 37 Nor did anybody else. The serious opposition, in fact, did not come from communist reactionaries or proletarian discontent, but from some of the very elites who had led the original charge towards the market economy. 
Capitalism in command?
How, then, did the Russian reformers do when it came to implementing shock therapy? Better than one would have expected, but worse than one would have liked, and not well enough to save Russia from financial collapse in 1998.
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Liberalization had the most dramatic initial effect. Most price controls were lifted on 2 January 1992, and the rudiments of a market economy quickly surfaced. Not all prices were freed up however: energy prices for example were fixed for several years, while housing and utilities remained price-controlled. Measures to liberalize foreign trade were also undertaken. This led to a flood of imports -including food -and soon accounted for about half of all consumer spending. After a year's hiatus there was also an export boom, as producers switched their sales of oil, gas, metals, and chemicals from the CIS to hard-currency markets.
There were however a number of obvious flaws in the programme of liberalization. businesses did not flourish, unlike in Poland where they became a vital engine of growth. Organized crime and bureaucratic regulation also did much to undermine Russian entrepreneurship. And while some effort was made to encourage foreign investment, the barriers -from political obstruction to the lack of legal protection -always remained high. Consequently, there was no great rush by Western firms to invest in Russia and by 1998 Russia had cumulative foreign investment of some $6 billion -less than Hungary, a country one tenth its size.
Stabilization took longer than liberalization to accomplish. The rouble was quickly made convertible into dollars, but inflation clocked 1,600 percent in 1992, wiping out people's hard-earned savings. It was not until 1995 that the money supply and budget deficit were reined in, and inflation (monthly, not annual) came down to single digits. This stabilization was a house built on sand, however, since the tightening monetary policy was accompanied by the dollarization and de-monetization of much of the economy. Many people kept their savings in dollars and many businesses conducted their transactions in dollars. Barter also spread apace, and by 1997 accounted for 50 percent of all transactions in some industrial sectors (especially energy). Arrears also became a money-substitute: arrears to suppliers, to tax authorities, and in paying wages to one's workers.
In 1995, on the advice of the IMF, it was decided to finance the budget deficit in a non-inflationary wayby issuing treasury bonds (GKOs) rather than by printing money. On the surface, everything looked fine.
From 1995 the rouble held its value against the dollar within the corridor announced by the Central Bankeven gradually appreciated in real terms. But this had its downside and very soon two parallel economies began to emerge: one monetized, taxed, and recorded for the international community; and the other hidden from view, demonetized, and at best paying taxes in kind, in goods and services, at local level. Gaddy and
Ickes have referred to this barter system as a 'virtual economy' since it was based on subsidized, valuedestroying enterprises. But one could equally argue that the financial sector was almost 'virtual' as well, particularly in light of the collapse of the banking system in August 1998. GDP in 1989 to 10-12 percent by 1997, even though spending was still running at 15-18 percent. These problems however tended to be explained away by the reformists. Thus the slump, they argued, was merely a product of changes in statistical reporting: formerly managers over-reported output for the planners, now they under-reported output for the tax man. And to the extent that the output fall was real, it reflected an end to the production of non-goods like nuclear submarines and busts of Lenin. Likewise, the fall in government revenue was nothing to be too concerned about either. The Russian state's share in GDP was too large anyway for an economy at its level of development. The government, moreover, had to learn that it must get out of the business of subsidizing farms or paying the utility costs of residents in economically non-viable parts of the old communist economy.
This brings us to the issue of privatization. Hailed as a major victory for the reformers, within the space of a few years up to 70 percent of productive assets had been transferred out of state ownership into private hands. The privatization took place in three phases.
First, there was the conversion of state firms into private corporations at the stroke of a pen. The shares of these firms were held by federal and regional governments, or given to other firms (suppliers and customers). Gazprom, Russia's largest company, was privatized in this manner already in 1990, with the incumbent directors acting as trustees for the federal government's 40 percent stake in the firm. Most of Russia' commercial banks were also created in this way, and they grew fat through currency speculation, handling government accounts, and trading in treasury bills.
Second, there was the voucher privatization program of 1992. Citizens were given vouchers which they could use to bid for shares in former state enterprises, now registered as private corporations. Unlike the Czech scheme, however, workers and managers could opt to acquire a majority of the shares in their own firm, using a combination of vouchers and ploughed back profits. Seventy percent of firms chose the worker-manager buyout. However, in most of them control over the shares was quickly concentrated in the hands of a small group of managers.
Third, there was privatization through cash sales, beginning in 1994. As we have already noted, the government was reluctant to sell to foreign investors while Russian buyers lacked the necessary capital.
Thus in 1995 the privatization 'tsar', Anatolii Chubais, decided to go with the idea of swapping packets of shares in some leading oil and metals companies in return for loans from Russian banks. The transactions reeked of corruption: the prices were low relative to the firms' quoted earnings, and most of the auctions were by an affiliate of the bank organizing the bidding. Furthermore, much of the money that the banks were lending to the government came from state coffers. The loans-for-shares scheme enabled the Moscowbased banks to move into the industrial sector and try their hand at wealth creation. After the hiatus of the 1996 presidential election campaign, during which the oligarchs circled the wagons to ensure Yeltsin's reelection, privatization sales resumed.
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The 1998 August crisis have scored a few victories: nonetheless many of those who had been the beneficiary of change -the new oligarchs -were now standing in the way of further radical surgery. They were not even paying their taxes, while most of the money they were making was flooding out of Russia into Western bank accounts. Nor, he argued, could serious people turn a blind eye to the fact that Russia was living on the 'never, never' with a foreign debt now standing at well over $140bn and rising. Workers were also not being paid, and while a few at the top were getting fabulously wealthy, living standards for the overwhelming majority of Russians were continuing to decline. The outlook he concluded was by no means rosy. Others agreed. For once the experts (unfortunately) managed to get Russia right, and within a month of The Economist hitting the news-stands in July, Russia was facing a meltdown of epic proportions. 46 The immediate cause of the August crisis was the chronic fiscal deficit, in turn the product of an essentially unreformed economy in deep recession that produced little wealth, and a government unable to tax those profits that were being made. Experts are still divided over whether the August crisis was inevitable given Russia's deep structural flaws, or if it was just bad luck, the product of unfavorable international circumstances and some poor policy responses. Arguably the leading two policy errors, made back in 1995 and sustained to the bitter end, were fixing the rouble exchange rate at too high a level, and the decision to finance the yawning government deficit through international borrowing. Vladimir Popov has shown that the ratio of the rouble exchange rate to purchasing power parity (PPP) rose from around 50 percent (the level of most East European currencies)
to 70 percent between 1995 and 1997. 47 This priced Russian manufactures out of export markets and exposed them to fierce import competition. Inevitably this led to a massive trade deficit (by mid-1998 Russia was running a $5.8 billion deficit). To add to its woes, Asian stock markets started to fold in October 1997, causing a Gaddarene flight from emerging markets by international investors. Then, to make matters worse -much worse -Russia was hit badly by the ongoing fall in the price of oil from an average of $18 a barrel to a mere $11 by the end of 1998. This not only weakened Russia's trading position, but sent out a signal that it might not be able to underwrite its spiralling international debts (half of Russia's export earnings came from the sale of oil and gas).
In light of these trends, there were increasing calls for a devaluation of the rouble -from maverick economist Andrei Illarionov to financier Boris Berezovsky. Outside observers discounted these concerns, operating on the assumption that Russia was too big to fail. Meanwhile, the majority of the population slipped into survival mode.
The IMF, naturally enough, insists it did nothing wrong. The problem, it argues, was never its advice but rather the failure of the Russian government to follow its advice. 52 Moreover, in its view, there was really no alternative to what it originally advocated. But this is plainly absurd. On the one hand, this assumes there was no other middle way between neo-liberalism and central planning; on the other, it ignores the simple fact that its own remedies -whether they were applied in Russia or not -have always tended to lead to indebtedness, inequality and impoverishment. 53 Thus even if its medicine had been swallowed completely (and much of it was) it would still have had pretty appalling consequences.
In Russia there were of course very specific problems and here it might be useful to distinguish between two phases in the so-called transition. In phase one -primarily 1992 -Russian government policy was really Western bank purchases of domestic GKOs, which together with all other loans amounted to something close to $150 billion.
In effect, the international community bailed out the sinking ship of state and bought Boris Yeltsin four years in office between 1992 and 1996, a period in which some fortunes were made but which saw little lasting progress towards real structural reform. Certainly, the IMF were aware that the Russian government was failing to meet all the conditions attached to its loans; nonetheless, money continued to be released at quarterly intervals, although some tranches were delayed for a few months. Loan agreements with foreign governments are confidential documents, and it will be up to future scholars to reconstruct the precise record. However, it seems prima facie that the IMF fell into the trap of moral hazard. Once the Russian government realized that it could fudge compliance with loan conditions, it made it that much harder to try to make the conditions stick the next time round. The loans of course may never be recovered. There is also a very real danger that Russian politicians will seek to blame those who advanced the loans for their own economic mismanagement. According to a Public Opinion Foundation poll, when Russians were asked in 1998 whether the IMF had brought benefit or harm to Russia, 17 percent said benefit, 19 percent harm, and 46 didn't know. By March 1999 however opinion had shifted: 14 percent now said benefit, 43 percent harm, and 28 percent had no opinion. 55 We thus seem to have the worst of all possible worlds: on the one side stands Russia, trapped by a huge overhang of debt that can only retard its recovery; on the other is the West, locked into an embrace from it cannot escape with a recalcitrant debtor that shows no signs of mending its ways. Ordinary Russians also feel cheated. They have been forced to give up what they once had -limited though that undoubtedly wasbut have gained very little in return. The only people it seems who have no regrets are those Western advisors who helped get Russia into the mess it is now in. But perhaps even they should be regarded less as monsters and more as victims of their own false consciousness, and of a particular economic ideology that brooked no dissent. Certainly, in the climate of the early 1990s, there was no way that the US in particular
